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that a court must address it sua sponte if not raised."'35 The court then
addressed whether the State's failure to raise the defense at the district
court level amounted to a waiver.
First, the court considered the general rule that "claims not adjudi-
cated below, and in particular defenses that have not been raised in a
pleading, by motion, or at trial, normally will be considered waived and
cannot be heard for the first time on appeal."'36 In habeas proceedings,
the court found that waiver usually takes the form of procedural default,
resulting in a bar to a claim not presented to the state court "unless the
petitioner can show cause for the default and actual prejudice. 37 The
court concluded that such procedural default applies equally to the
defendant and to the State. Therefore, if a claim or defense is not raised
in the court below, it will be barred on appeal.
38
In Williams, because the State failed to raise a retroactivity defense
at the district court level, or at the first argument before the court of
appeals, it was deemed to have waived its Teague defense to the
application of the MillslMcKoy rule.
Ill. Application in Virginia.
Defense counsel should be fully aware of the implications of the
Teague rule. Timing on appeal, as well as preserving all appealable
issues throughout the pre-trial, trial and post-trial processes, becomes
increasingly important in obtaining all potential constitutional benefits
for a capital defendant. Opinions such as Williams make it clear that
defense counsel need to remain aware and informed as to potential or
pending issues before the courts of appeal and/or Supreme Court.
Because a defendant's conviction does not become final for Teague
purposes until the end of the direct appeals process, the longer one takes
in thatprocess, thebetterone's chances forbenefitting from a "new rule."
35 Id. at 458. See also Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990)
(declaring Teague rule "is not 'jurisdictional"').
36 Id. (citing Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Internal Revenue
Service, 765 F.2d 1174, 1176, n.1 (D.C.Cir. 1985)).
Unfortunately, timing may be all that separates one defendant from
another in benefitting from the recognition of new constitutional inter-
pretations or applications.
When the Supreme Court announced the Teague retroactivity rule,
the Court appeared to signal an end to the potential benefits of new rules
for defendants on collateral appeal. Very few defendants were expected
to find themselves the beneficiaries of one of Teague's narrow excep-
tions. The Fourth Circuit's holding in Williams, however, provides
encouragement for future findings of exceptions to the Teague rule. Of
particular benefit to Virginia defendants is the Fourth Circuit's apparent
willingness to ferret out abasis for finding aTeague exception. If defense
counsel has diligently preserved and presented all potential constitu-
tional claims throughout the appeals process, a defendant may still reap
the benefits of future Supreme Court decisions.
The most important practical aspect of Williams to Virginia practi-
tioners may be the Fourth Circuit's recognition that procedural default
can work against the state. While taking care to preserve and protect the
defendant's claims for relief on appeal, defense counsel should also be
aware of the Commonwealth's failure to raise defenses during the
appeals process. Certainly, defense counsel should take care not to alert
the Commonwealth to any omissions at early stages of the appeals
process, particularly involving a Teague defense of retroactivity. If the
Fourth Circuit consistently applies its ruling in Williams, defendants may
profit from new rules simply by the failure of the Commonwealth to raise
the retroactivity defense, thus broadening the scope of potential benefits
in spite of Teague.
Summary and analysis by:
Susan F. Henderson
37 Id. (citing Bassette v. Thompson, 915 F.2d 932, 937 (4th Cir.
1990)). See case summary of Bassette, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 3,
No. 2,. 8 (1991).38 Id. at 459.
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FACTS
After his first conviction and sentence of death was reversed,
Sylvester Lewis Adams was retried and then convicted of kidnapping,
murder and housebreaking and given a death sentence. Subsequently,
the state circuit court denied Adams' request for postconviction relief,
and both the South Carolina and United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari. 1 The United States magistrate recommended denial of the
federal writ of habeas corpus that Adams then filed, which had alleged
numerous errors at the trial court level. The United States District Court
for the District of South Carolina accepted the magistrate's recommen-
dation and denied Adams' petition.
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, Adams raised a number of errors at
1 Adams v. Aiken, 476 U.S. 1109 (1986).
2 Adams raised several errors that will not be discussed in this case
summary, including claims that (I) Adams' conviction violated due
process due to his mental incompetence during portions of the trial, (2)
his death sentence violated the Eighth Amendment, as the jury failed to
various stages of the trial. 2 At voir dire, Adams claimed error because
one of the prospective jurors stated that he would accept the testimony of
a police officer over the testimony of a private citizen. In response, the
trial judge inquired whether the prospective juror could make a decision
based on the evidence presented and on the instructions given him by the
court. When the prospective juror answered in the affirmative, the trial
judge qualified him over Adams' objection. At the time, Adams had two
peremptory strikes remaining.
At the guilt stage, the trial judge, in his instructions to the jury,
defined reasonable doubt as "synonymous" with "proof to a moral
certainty" and a "substantial doubt, a doubt for which you can give a
reason." Adams argued that the instruction violated his due process
rights.
find the murder occurred during the commission of the kidnapping and
housebreaking, (3) the trial judge's failure to limit definition of aggravat-
ing factors in his instructions to the jury violated Adams' Eighth
Amendment rights.
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In his closing statement at the sentencing phase, the prosecutor
mentioned four words that he felt were the qualities of a person able to
live in society: "rapport, coping, love, and repentance." Adams claimed
that the prosecutor's urging of the jury to consider whether Adams would
ever be capable of handling any of these four requisites was in effect
improperly telling the jury to consider his mitigating evidence of mental
impairment as an aggravating factor.
At the sentencing phase, Adams also alleged error based on the
judge's response to the jury when they inquired whether a confession by
Adams was a mitigating factor. The judge had responded that it was not
a statutorily mitigating factor but told them they could "consider the case
in its entirety."
HOLDING
In affirming the denial of Adams' writ of habeas corpus, the Fourth
Circuit conceded that precedent existed for finding the trial court's
definition of reasonable doubt to be a violation of due process. 3 The court
held, however, that it could not apply the necessary case law retroactively
to Adams.4 In considering Adams' claim of error at voir dire, the court
found that Adams would have first needed to use all of his preemptory
challenges to eliminate objectionable jurors before he would be able to
complain of a violation of his constitutionally protected right to impartial
jurors; 5 because Adams had used only nine of his ten challenges, the
court found that Adams did not have a legally cognizable complaint.
6
The court also found that the trial court's handling and explanations of
mitigating and aggravating factors effectively conveyed to the jury the
information it needed to adequately consider both aggravating and
mitigating factors. Finally, the Fourth Circuit concluded that comments
made by the prosecution during closing remarks were not prejudicial, in
the sense of leading the jury to treat mitigating evidence as an aggravat-
ing factor.
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
I. Reasonable Doubt and Teague's New Rule Doctrine
In its analysis of the trial judge's definition of reasonable doubt, the
appeals court found possible error in his equating of "beyond a reason-
able doubt" with "to a moral certainty" and "substantial doubt." 7 Citing
Cage v. Louisiana,8 the court compared language that the Supreme Court
found unconstitutional with the language the trial judge used in Adams.
The court determined that the instruction given inAdams impermissibly
"diluted the reasonable doubt standard," 9 such that Adams, like Cage,
3 Adams v. Aiken, 965 F.2d 1306, 1311 (4th Cir. 1992) (relying on
Cage v. Louisiana, 111 S.Ct. 328 (1990)). See case summary of Cage,
Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 2, p. 5 (1991).
4 Adams, 965 F.2d at 1311 (citing Teague v. Lane, 498 U.S. 288
(1989)).
5 Id. at 1317.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 1310.
8 111 S.Ct. 339 (1990).
9 Adams, 965 F.2d at 1311.
10 489 U.S. 288, 305-10 (1989). The "new rule" doctrine was
intended "to promote finality based on faithful application of well
established constitutional standards existing at the time the case is heard,
even though laterdecisions may modify these standards." Case summary
of Cage v. Louisiana, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 2, p. 6 (1991).
N 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (holding that the prosecution must prove
each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt).
12 Adams, 965 F.2d at 1312. The Teague Court found that "'a case
announces a new rule when it breaks new ground or imposes a new
was held to a higher standard than that allowed under due process.
Despite finding a constitutional violation, the court proceeded to
state that it could not provide a remedy because of the "new rule
doctrine." In Teague v. Lane,10 the source of the new rule doctrine, the
Supreme Court held that a case on collateral review generally cannot
receive the benefit of rules that did not exist at the time the conviction
became final. Therefore, because the Supreme Court decided Cage in
1990 after Adams' conviction was final (in 1983), the court stated Cage
could not be retroactively applied.
Because Teague does not bar retroactive application of new cases
which merely rearticulate or apply an older rule, Adams had argued that
Cage did not articulate a new rule, but instead was simply an application
ofln re Winship.11 After considering the meaning of the term "new rule"
under Teague and the nature of the Cage "reasonable doubt" rule,
however, the appeals court concluded that Cage presented a new rule.
12
The court reasoned that although much case law criticizes how courts
have defined and diluted "reasonable doubt," Cage was the first case
reversed for just such a violation.
13
Moreover, the court rejected Adams' argument that even if a new
rule, Cage should be seen as falling within Teague's exception for "new
rules that 'require the observance of those procedures that ... are implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty.' 14 While the court found that Cage
would improve the accuracy of the trial, it concluded that it did have an
impact on bedrock elements regarding fairness. Therefore, the court
declined to apply Cage retroactively. 15
Although the court found Adam's Cage claim to be Teague-barred,
the court did acknowledge that the definition of reasonable doubt used in
the jury instruction violated due process. Therefore, Cage seems to offer
significant authority and encouragement for challenges on the question
of reasonable doubt. Virginia practitioners should be prepared to object
to such instructions and to proffer instructions in their stead.
II. Voir Dire and the Right to an Impartial Jury
In evaluating the impartiality of the juror who stated he would take
the word of a police officer above that of a private citizen, the Fourth
Circuit turned to the federal statute and supporting case law governing
review of state trial court findings. 16 Under 28 United States Code
Section 2254(d), fact determinations made by the trial court are entitled
to a "presumption of correctness" in federal habeas corpus cases.
Supporting case law cited by the court showed that this presumption of
correctness extends to the trial court's determination of juror impartial-
ity.17 Therefore, the appeals court saw its only task as determining
whether, given the presumption of correctness, the trial record supported
obligation on the States or the Federal Government' or 'if the result was
not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction
became final."'Adams, 965 F.2d at 1311 (citing Teague, 489 U.S. at 301;
Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407,415 (1990); Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S.
484,488 (1990)). See case summary of Butler, Capital Defense Digest,
Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 2 (1990); and case summary of Saffle, Capital Defense
Digest, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 3 (1990).
13 Adams, 965 at 1312.
14 Id. ("This exception is limited to 'those new procedures without
which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished,'
... [that] both improve the accuracy of trial and 'alter our understanding
of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a
proceeding."') (qutoing Teague, 489 U.S. at 311,313; Sanyer, 110 S. Ct.
at 2831) (emphasis in original).
15 Id.
16 Id. at 1317.
17 Id. (citing Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1036-38 (1984)
(finding that trial court determination as to juror impartiality also is
entitled to presumption of correctness in federal habeas corpus cases)).
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the trial court's finding. They concluded that it did.
The appeals court also suggested that even if the juror was not
impartial, Adams suffered no legally cognizable prejudice. 18 The court
held that because Adams had an opportunity to excuse the juror with a
peremptory challenge but chose not to do so, he may not now object to
the judge's refusal to excuse any particular juror for cause. The court
concluded that Adams could have claimed error only if he first exercised
all of his peremptory challenges, and then an unqualified juror was
allowed to sit.
In light of Adams and the United States Supreme Court's recent
ruling inMorgan v. Illinois, 19 Virginia practitioners should consider voir
dire carefully. Morgan's constitutionally guaranteed reverse-Witherspoon
questions may limit the need for peremptory challenges, but practitioners
will want to make sure they use all of theirperemptory challenges in order
to clear the way forprejudice arguments. Morgan andAdams also stress
the need for practitioners to develop a record on attempted voir dire
questions and to make clear their reasons why certain jurors should be
struck for cause whom the judge is allowing to sit.
III. Jury Instructions on Mitigation
Adams argued on appeal that the trial judge had violated his rights
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by not instructing the
jurors that they could consider as mitigating any aspect of the case that
they felt merited it. Virginia requires no jury instruction regarding the
absolute liberty that each juror has to consider and give effect to any
mitigation,20 a problem compounded by the statutory verdict forms that
make no mention of mitigating factors. In Adams, the appeals court felt
it had been sufficient to encourage the jury to simply consider the entire
case.21 This was true despite the fact the jury had inquired as to whether
a specific piece of evidence-a confession by defendant-could be
considered as mitigating and the judge responded with only a generalized
reference that the jury could "consider the case in its entirety."
AfterAdams, attorneys facing such ageneral approach to mitigation
and aggravation should take it upon themselves to highlight certain
factors during argument as mitigating evidence (e.g., inAdams, stressing
to the jury that a confession was found mitigating evidence to be
considered). During closing arguments, practitioners will want to inform
jurors that "all evidence" to be considered in mitigation goes beyond the
factors that are statutorily enumerated, 22 that they as jury members
18 Id.
19 112 S. Ct. 2222 (1992) (finding voir dire on "reverse-
Witherspoon" issues constitutionally required). See case summary of
Morgan, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
20 Adams, 965 F.2d at 1319 (citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586
(1978) (holding that the sentencer must be allowed to independently
consider all evidence in mitigation that is relevant)).
21 Virginia also does not require instruction of jurors on their
responsibility to consider mitigating evidence, on the implications of
mitigating evidence, oron the defendant's choice as to whether to present
mitigation evidence. See Hansen, Mitigation: An Outline of Law,
MethodandStrategy, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 4, No. 2,p. 29 (1992).
22 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4. (B) (1990).
should consider fact-specific mitigating factors (perhaps enumerating
factors that have come to light throughout the trial), and that they should
consider the entire case, including any factors that arise in their delibera-
tions.
IV. Using Mitigating Evidence as Aggravating Factors
Immediately after his indictment, Adams underwent a psychiatric
examination at the State Hospital. Although the exam showed Adams to
be mildly retarded and suffering from "paranoid trends," the psychiatrist
found Adams competent to stand trial. While Adams claimed to be
deteriorating mentally, each court found Adams competent. In his
closing arguments, the prosecutor used four words-rapport, coping,
love, and repentance-to describe the features of a person able to
function in society. In so doing, the prosecutor arguably turned Adams'
mental disability, a mitigating factor, into an aggravating factor by
implying that because of the disability, Adams did not possess the
qualities necessary to function in society. At the time, Adams did not
object to the remarks nor did he move for a mistrial.
On appeal, Adams argued that the prosecutor's language suggesting
that the mental disability was aggravating rather than mitigating violated
his Eighth Amendment rights. 23 Cautioning against unsupported infer-
ences and highlighting Adams' failure to object in a timely fashion, the
Fourth Circuit found that the comments did not "infect the trial with
unfairness that caused the sentence to be a violation of due process." 24
Practitioners may find it worth noting that in Adams the court
seemed to imply that prosecution use of mitigating evidence as an
aggravating factor would raise constitutional problems-an argument
nullified by Adams' failure to object. In light of the court's reasoning,
Virginia practitioners must object and move for a mistrial whenever the
Commonwealth tries to argue mitigating factors as aggravating evi-
dence. While it is possible that the court may deny such an objection or
motion, a failure to act early in the process may later be read as
acceptance or may impede a determination of error. Further, practition-
ers will want to remember Penry v. Lynaugh25 for the proposition that
sentencers must be able to give effect to any mitigating factors, regard-
less of the existence of aggravating ones.
Summary and analysis by:
Roberta F. Green
23 As articulated by the United States Supreme Court, a defendant's
Eighth Amendment right is that "the sentencer [can] ... not be precluded
from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's
character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the
defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death." Lockett v.
Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,604 (1978) (emphasis in original). See also, Zant v.
Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 886 (1983) (finding that attaching an aggravat-
ing label to mitigating evidence would require the jury's decision to
impose death to be set aside).
2 4 Adams, 965 F.2dat 1320 (citingDarden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S.
168, 181 (1986)).
25 109 S.Ct. 2934 (1989). See case summary of Pemy, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 2, No. 1, p. 2 (1989).
